

# Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages<sup>1</sup>

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*This study evaluates the popular hypothesis that poverty, inequality, and poor economic development are root causes of terrorism. Employing a series of multiple regression analyses on terrorist incidents and casualties in ninety-six countries from 1986 to 2002, the study considers the significance of poverty, malnutrition, inequality, unemployment, inflation, and poor economic growth as predictors of terrorism, along with a variety of political and demographic control variables. The findings are that, contrary to popular opinion, no significant relationship between any of the measures of economic development and terrorism can be determined. Rather, variables such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. The article concludes that “social cleavage theory” is better equipped to explain terrorism than are theories that link terrorism to poor economic development.*

That terrorism and other forms of political violence are a product of poverty and poor distribution has become a core assumption among national and international policymakers since the events of September 11. The presumed link between material want and terrorist activity has been cited by political figures from across the political spectrum and has found its way into mainstream economic development and international security policy discussions while shaping debate on an array of issues from African humanitarian aid to the reconstruction of Iraq. To cite a few examples: In November 2001, forty-one heads of state addressed the UN General Assembly urging that the crisis of international terrorism be addressed alongside the issues of poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment. Speaking before the General Assembly, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan proclaimed, “No one in this world can be comfortable or safe when so many people are suffering and deprived.”<sup>2</sup> Describing terrorism as the “dark side of globalization” and noting that one-half of the world’s population survives on less than \$2 per day, former U.S. President Bill Clinton urged American policymakers to promote national security by easing the growing international disparities in wealth in a January 2002 speech.<sup>3</sup> Vice President for Private Sector Development, Infrastructure and Guarantees at the World Bank,

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Nemat Shafik, identified Third World countries with legacies of economic stagnation, high levels of unemployment, and uneven economic development as, “fertile ground on which terrorist seeds can flourish.”<sup>4</sup> Discussion of the socioeconomic roots of terrorism also permeated the December 2001 gathering of Nobel Peace Prize laureates in Oslo, with Desmond Tutu, Kim Dae-Jung, and Oscar Arias Sanchez each locating the causes of terrorism in poverty, inequality, and the absence of social justice in the developing world.<sup>5</sup> But perhaps the definitive indication that international poverty has become a widely accepted explanation for the incidence of terrorism is the statement by United States President George W. Bush—a conservative—delivered at the Monterey Development Summit in March of 2002: “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.”<sup>6</sup>

These statements, which define a theoretical approach to terrorism I term the “rooted-in-poverty hypothesis,” illustrate an understanding of terrorism as an expression of socioeconomic discontent and desperation. Impoverished countries teeming with poorly educated, unemployed masses qualified by a widening gap between the rich and poor combined with low literacy rates are fermentation tanks for dangerous and violent militants. The low levels of economic and social development increase the appeal of political extremism and encourage political violence and instability.

However, a glance at the basic descriptive statistics on terrorism and socioeconomic indicators does not seem to immediately validate the “rooted-in-poverty hypothesis.” Tables 1 and 2 display the top ten countries in the world where terrorist attacks for the period 1986 to 2002<sup>7</sup> took place, and where people were victimized by terrorism alongside various measures of economic development. Table 1 displays the top ten country sites for terrorist attacks<sup>8</sup> in rank order with their corresponding period average per capita gross domestic products and Human Development Index (HDI) rankings and classifications. Both per capita GDP, a measure of total wealth produced and consumed in a country divided by population, and HDI, an index that measures level of economic development considering income, literacy, and life expectancy, are widely used measurements for comparing levels of poverty and wealth across countries.

**Table 1.** Top ten countries for terrorist incidents—GDP per capita and human development indices

Country	Incidents 1986–2002	(Rank)	Average GDP per capita	2001 Human development index rank
India	237	(1)	\$2,358	115 (Medium)
Colombia	129	(2)	5,615	62 (Medium)
Yemen	59	(3)	1,608	133 (Low)
Turkey	56	(4)	5,805	82 (Medium)
Greece	48	(6)	11,862	23 (High)
Israel/Palestine*	48	(6)	12,651	49 (High)
Angola	45	(8)	2,510	146 (Low)
Peru	45	(8)	4,622	73 (Medium)
Pakistan	40	(9)	1,928	138 (Low)
France	39	(10)	22,897	13 (High)

\*Figures for per capita GDP and Human Development Index ranking are population-weighted averages for the State of Israel and Occupied Territories.

**Table 2.** Top ten countries for casualties due to terrorism—GDP per capita and human development indices

Country	Casualties 1986–2002	(Rank)	Average GDP per capita	2001 Human development index rank
Kenya	5,365	(1)	\$1,211	123 (Medium)
United States	4,011	(2)	27,816	6 (High)
India	2,779	(3)	2,358	115 (Medium)
Israel/Palestine*	2,257	(4)	12,651	49 (High)
Sri Lanka	1,815	(5)	3,365	81 (Medium)
Iraq†	1,646	(6)	3,413	106 (Medium)
Russian Federation	1,314	(7)	8,377	60 (Medium)
Saudi Arabia	1,037	(8)	10,348	68 (Medium)
United Kingdom	984	(9)	19,627	14 (High)
Colombia	835	(10)	5,615	62 (Medium)

\*Figures for per capita GDP and Human Development Index ranking are population-weighted averages for the State of Israel and Occupied Territories.

†GDP per capita and HDI given in pre-1991 figures only.

What we would expect, given the hypothesis that poverty and inequality are related to increased terrorism rates, is that most if not all of the countries on this top ten list for terrorist incidents would have quite low per capita GDP figures, and would score poorly in terms of the Human Development Index. That is not the case. Only three of the ten countries fit the profile of low levels of socioeconomic development: Yemen, Angola, and Pakistan. Most of the countries are at medium levels of development and three, Greece, Israel-Palestine,<sup>9</sup> and France, are advanced, industrialized countries.

Table 2 ranks the top ten countries with regard to the intensity of terrorist activity from 1986 to 2002, measured as the number of casualties (deaths, injuries, and kidnappings) suffered in each country due to terrorism. In this ranking, none of the countries are classified as low level of development in terms of the HDI ranking. Most are ranked as “medium” with three industrialized and wealthy countries—the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel-Palestine—making up the top ten list.

What Tables 1 and 2 suggest, through mere reporting of descriptive statistics, is that the relationship between level of economic or social development and the phenomenon of terrorism may be complex or, perhaps, illusory. At first glance, Tables 1 and 2 are consistent with the findings of a survey study conducted by Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova,<sup>10</sup> in which the socioeconomic and educational backgrounds of Palestinian suicide bombers were found to be quite diverse and random. Moreover, the Krueger and Maleckova study found similar results when surveying public opinion among Palestinians about suicide bombing as a response to the Israeli Occupation: a wide socioeconomic cross section of respondents expressed support for the attacks. Poor and poorly educated Palestinians were no more likely to either support or participate in suicide terrorist attacks than were more affluent and better-educated Palestinians. Socioeconomic and education background were not predictors of terrorist activity or support for terrorism.

## Literature

The national and international policymakers quoted in the introduction are joined in this discussion by a large host of academic researchers who have produced volumes on the relationship between economic inequalities and violent political conflict. M. I. Lichbach<sup>11</sup> summarizes this voluminous body of research, noting that most social scientists regard *a priori* economic inequality to be a potentially important contributor to political violence and that most academic studies do regard socioeconomic disparities as an important variable in explaining the incidence of violent conflict. However, Lichbach demonstrates that over the last several decades the academy has not enjoyed the consensus that policymakers seem to have reached on the subject. A wide swath of scholars has examined the relationship between poverty, material deprivation, and unequal distribution of resources and mass political violence, and has found support both for and against the relationship. Because of this, he maintains that the “Economic Inequality-Political Conflict puzzle” has become a mainstay of social science research into why violent political conflict occurs.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps the paradigmatic study relating poverty and inequality with political violence is that by Ted Robert Gurr, who developed the term “relative deprivation,” which links economic disparity with the propensity of individuals to resort to violent political action. Gurr uses relative deprivation to “denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, that disposes men to violence.”<sup>13</sup> When individuals’ expectations of economic or political goods exceed the actual distribution of those goods, political violence is more likely. Gurr’s work provides a theoretical base for a large number of scholars studying political violence, including Samuel Huntington,<sup>14</sup> who borrows from the relative deprivation framework to explain the increase in political violence witnessed in the United States and in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s.

The alternative approach to Gurr’s “deprivation school” of political violence—and violent regime change through revolution—is Charles Tilly’s<sup>15</sup> work on political opportunity structures. According to Tilly, the primary predictor of revolutions, strikes, insurgencies, and incidents of mass political terror is the degree to which the existing political system that contextualizes these events facilitates independent organization and collective action. Though the citizenry of a dictatorship might be deprived materially, the paucity of avenues for expression of discontent or the degree of state repression of autonomous political expression will suppress activity like terrorism. In societies where independent political expression is permitted, non-state political association is allowed, and the government does not resort to oppression to control political outcomes, deprivation can indeed lead to political violence. However, the opportunity structure is requisite.

Gurr’s “deprivation school” and Tilly’s “political opportunity school” have inspired a generation of scholars to search for the empirical roots of terrorism and political violence. Indeed, the number of studies that adopt a deprivation and/or political opportunity approach to explaining political violence is quite large and covers a variety of studies. To briefly note the studies that make use of the deprivation model: Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson’s<sup>16</sup> study of eighty-five developing states between 1973–1977 found that income inequality, rather than maldistribution of land, is a (slightly) significant predictor of political violence, even when controlling for regime repression and level of national economic development. Through an analysis of fifty-one developing countries between 1968 and 1972, Bruce

London and Thomas D. Robinson<sup>17</sup> found a significant relationship between income inequality and political violence that was mainly mediated by the degree to which distribution of wealth in domestic economies had been altered due to penetration by multinational corporations.

In a study on a related topic—civil war and insurgency—James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin<sup>18</sup> also found socioeconomic factors to be significant. In their empirical study of 127 civil wars between 1945 and 1999, Fearon and Laitin demonstrated that poverty is a positive predictor of violent domestic conflict, along with general political instability, rough terrain, and large population levels, because it is related to “financially and bureaucratically weak states” and aids insurgents in recruitment. However, they do not find ethnic or religious diversity within countries to be a significant predictor of civil war, contrary to the assumptions of most scholars. Instead they make several arresting observations with important implications for the empirical study of terrorism: 1) that an important locus for the creation of conditions favorable for insurgency lies in the weakness of the state, particularly when state organizational and bureaucratic weakness leads to corrupt and incompetent counter-insurgency practices; 2) that weak states may be more prone to brutal, indiscriminate retaliation against populations where the insurgency is located, thereby fostering sympathy with insurgents among the local population; and 3) that large population levels may aid insurgents by raising the costs of state surveillance and policing.

The role of socioeconomic inequality or class conflict also plays a prominent role in case analyses of political violence surrounding insurgency in Iran,<sup>19</sup> South Africa,<sup>20</sup> and Colombia.<sup>21</sup> Manus I. Midlarsky<sup>22</sup> found a strong relationship between patterned inequality and the probability of political violence in Latin America and the Middle East in his nonaggregate case analysis. Also, Morehead Kennedy<sup>23</sup> cites growing social diversity, the “erosion of moral authority of the U.S. government,” and poverty as conditions that are likely to instigate terrorist acts. Specifically, he links the prevalence of “widespread poverty” in the takeover of the Japanese embassy by Tupac Amaru terrorists and credits the increase in incidents of terrorism in the 1990s to the information superhighway and enhanced global communication technologies.

The political opportunity approach is also amply represented, though frequently scholars who adopt this approach also find evidence to support socioeconomic causes of political violence. Douglas A. Hibbs<sup>24</sup> was not able to validate the relative deprivation model in his study of incidents of political violence between 1948 and 1967. He instead found that the principle predictors of political violence were the incidence of previous political violence (instability) and government acts of coercion. Austin T. Turk<sup>25</sup> argues that terrorism is the “product of systemic processes generated by relationships of inequality” but also notes that terrorism is more frequent in democratic societies due to the easier communication and dissemination of ideology and the “displacement of political conflict to freer settings.” Turk also provides a lengthy discussion of the origins of state terrorism as the result of the breakdown of traditional authority structures and efforts to construct new ones. Lawrence C. Hamilton and James D. Hamilton<sup>26</sup> conducted a statistical analysis of international terrorism in sixteen countries over the period 1968–1978 and found that the containment and reduction of terrorist activity is facilitated by conditions of repression rather than reform. More open societies are not as equipped to respond to terrorism effectively. Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede’s<sup>27</sup> analysis of 131 countries between 1973 and 1977 produced three essential findings: that rates of domestic political violence are higher at intermediate levels of

regime repression than at high or low levels of repression; that high rates of economic growth reduce political violence; and that political separatist movements increase it. Kurt Schock<sup>28</sup> combines the deprivation and political opportunity approaches in his study of political violence during the period 1973–1977, finding that the degree of state repression moderates the relationship between economic inequality and political violence. Schock also found that class-based violent conflicts are moderated differently by the regime structure than are ethnic-based conflicts. Finally, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's<sup>29</sup> study of forty-five civil wars between 1960 and 1999 concludes that the incidence of domestic political violence is better explained by the opportunity of insurgents to finance operations and recruit members rather than by "objective grievances" such as poor socioeconomic conditions.

Then there is the large body of scholars that credit factors other than poverty, inequality, or political opportunity. To present a few examples: Harold R. Kerbo<sup>30</sup> points to the involvement of foreign powers and the role of foreign influence in affecting the prevalence of domestic political violence in developing countries. Stephen M. Walt<sup>31</sup> considers the threat to transnational security posed by "failed states" that are unable to govern their own domestic territories. He refers to these states as "breeding grounds of instability, mass migration and murder." Finally, Robert I. Rotberg<sup>32</sup> expands upon this theme by describing failed states as "reservoirs and exporters of terror."

## Analysis

This study, therefore, treads on the fertile ground planted by a large body of scholars. What it hopes to accomplish, given the large amount of work already done on the subject, is to empirically reconsider the relationship between socioeconomic variables measuring poverty and the incidence and intensity of interstate terrorism in the *most* contemporary context. None of the aforementioned empirical-statistical studies specifically examines terrorism beyond 1979, while the more comprehensive and up-to-date empirical studies focus on civil war and general domestic insurgency rather than terrorism, which are regarded as related yet substantively different phenomenon. There are two potential problems with this limitation. First, much of the empirical work has focused *solely* on the 1970s—a decade characterized by unusually high degrees of a wide variety of political turmoil cross-nationally.<sup>33</sup> This introduces the potential for bias—call it a "1970s effect"—and lends support for evaluation of other decades. Additionally, many of the studies<sup>34</sup> examine a quite narrow time-frame: 1973–1977. It is a bit worrisome to draw the broad conclusions that they do from such a limited set of observations. Second, the relevance of these studies begs to be validated through an extension of the analysis through the twenty-first century. The 1980s and 1990s and the first few years of the new millennium may yield new insights into how terrorism works and what precipitates it.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to focus and extend the analysis done by previous researchers into the 1980s, the 1990s, and through to the year 2002, and to evaluate the popular "rooted-in-poverty hypothesis." It specifically seeks to determine through multiple regression analysis the degree to which socioeconomic variables predict terrorism compared to non-socioeconomic variables previously tested by scholars—state repression, population, religious and ethnic diversity—and to evaluate a new potential predictor of terrorism so far unexamined by scholars: the social cleavages.

The inclusion of the latter as an independent variable is informed by the “social cleavage theory” of party systems in industrialized societies<sup>35</sup> and is an attempt to bridge the spheres of state and society to locate the roots of terrorism. The study uses the stability of party systems as a way to measure the capacity of the state and governing system to manage socially-based political conflicts in society nonviolently. According to the social cleavage theory, a large number of political parties in the legislature (more than two or three) usually signifies deep social divisions in the electorate that contribute to government fragility and general political disorder.<sup>36</sup> Specifically, countries with multiparty systems are plagued by frequent elections, unmanageable governing coalitions, extremist or “anti-system” parties, and incoherent government policies that are the result of complex compromises in party coalitions. Multiparty systems, therefore, are “weaker” than two- and three-party systems and are also more prone to political violence.<sup>37</sup>

### *Dependent Variables*

The study employs an ordinary-least squares multiple regression analysis of the incidence and casualty rates of terrorism in ninety-six countries between 1986 and 2002, the years for which the U.S. State Department has collected country-level data. The dataset used in the analysis was built through an event-count coding of incidents of terrorism and the casualties due to terrorism described in the “Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents” found in the State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism* serial publication for the years 1986 to 2003 inclusive. For the analysis, incidents and casualties of terrorism are operationally defined in the same manner as that found in Title 2 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) whereby, “[t]he term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant<sup>38</sup> targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” (U.S. Department of State 2001:17) Therefore, each time a single terrorist attack is mentioned in *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, a terrorist incident is registered for the country where it occurred in the year that it occurred. In the case of a terrorist incident that begins in one country and terminates in a second or third, the incident is allocated to the country where the event originated, though cases of this sort account for less than five percent of the total dataset. All incidents are recorded based on the country of occurrence, not the nationality or national legal status of the perpetrator.<sup>39</sup> Casualties due to terrorism are operationally defined as a murder, injury, or kidnapping by terrorists and are recorded based on the number of victims mentioned in the report.<sup>40</sup>

The independent variables used in the analysis include a collection of economic variables, demographic variables, and political variables. The expectation at the outset is that if the validity of the “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis is valid, we would expect to find a robust number of the economic variables to be significant predictors of the incidence and casualty rate of terrorism worldwide.

### *Economic Variables*

“HDI 1985–99,” the first economic variable, is a measure of the Human Development Index, employed by the United Nations Development Program and reported in the *Human Development Report*, averaged over the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and 1999 per country. The Human Development Index is “a summary measure of human

development” which aggregates three key indicators—life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rates, and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross school enrollment ration and gross domestic product per capita—for each country as a way to round out and add a “human quality of life” dimension to the more often used indicator of development: GDP per capita.<sup>41</sup> The expectation is that high HDI levels are negatively associated with terrorism. “GINI Coefficient” is another economic variable employed which inserts the latest available (within the 1986–2002 timeframe) GINI index per country. The GINI Index is a measure of the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption among national households deviates from a completely equitable distribution. GINI is measured on a scale of 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (absolute inequality). The expectation is that high GINI Coefficient values should be accompanied by high levels of terrorist activity. “GDP Growth” measures the average annual increase or decrease of gross domestic product per capita in each country between 1986 and 2002. Given the strong correlation between economic growth and poverty alleviation, it is assumed that healthy GDP growth rates will be negatively related to terrorism and political violence. “Inflation,” or the average annual inflation rate per country for the period 1986 and 2002, is also included in the analysis. The expectation is that high inflation rates will be positively related to terrorism, as there is significant evidence that hyperinflation is related to regime change and political instability,<sup>42</sup> and that political instability is positively related to political violence.<sup>43</sup> “Unemployment,” or the average national unemployment rate for each country, would be expected to bear a significant positive relationship with terrorism, as unemployment precipitates the stress of idle workers who might suffer from unmet economic expectations and therefore turn to political violence, as predicted by Gurr’s “relative deprivation” model.<sup>44</sup> Finally, “Calories Per Capita,” or average daily Per capita supply of calories, is placed into the statistical models as a potential negative predictor of terrorism. Daily caloric intake is a measure of a country’s basic level of human development, and one would expect that low levels of average daily calorie supply, indicating a country with low levels of food stability and high levels of famine, would be a significant predictor of terrorism, if the “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis is valid.

### *Demographic Variables*

Inclusion of demographic variables in the analysis allows a consideration of factors related to socioeconomic health as well as alternative predictors of terrorism related to a country’s opportunity structure. Inspired by the robust findings of Fearon and Laitin,<sup>45</sup> “Population,” or a country’s average national population from 1975 to 2000, is considered as a potential predictor. Again, the expectation is that countries with large populations will have to face higher costs for counter-terrorism policies. Terrorists can use large populations to obscure their operations, escape detection, finance operations, and recruit members. A positive relationship between population and the incidence and casualty rate due to terrorism is expected. “Population Growth,” likewise, calculated as the aggregate growth rate of the national population for the period 1986 to 2002, would be expected to be a positive predictor of terrorism. The expectation is that a rapid increase in population puts a considerable strain on the economic and political system of a county and may be accompanied by a rise in all criminal activity, including terrorism.<sup>46</sup> Finally, to test the findings of Fearon and Laitin,<sup>47</sup> who did not find ethnic or religious diversity to be a significant



predictor of civil war when considered alongside other predictors, “Ethno-Religious Diversity” is considered in the analysis with the expectation that it will be positively related to terrorism. “Ethno-Religious Diversity” is measured as the multiplied average *inverse* percentages of the largest ethnic groups and the largest religious groups in a country during the years considered, 1986–2002. (Therefore, a country where the combined (multiplied) percentage of the population composed of the largest ethnic and religious community is 90 percent would have an Ethno-Religious Diversity score of 10 percent, indicating a relatively ethnically and religiously homogeneous society.) The expectation, again, is that terrorist activity is more likely to occur in diverse societies, where the potential and opportunity for ethnic and religious communitarian violence is greater.<sup>48</sup>

### *Political Variables*

Several political variables are also included in both analyses. The first two measure the opportunity structure for political opposition to the state. “Repression” measures the degree of political and civil freedom within the country examined for the period 1986 to 2002 using the average of two indices produced by the nonpartisan think tank Freedom House.<sup>49</sup> The indices, termed “FH Scores,” are coded as a number between one and seven, where one indicates a country that is “completely free” in terms of political rights or civil liberties and seven indicates a country that is “completely not free.” Likewise, “ $\Delta$ Repression” measures the degree of change of a country’s political or civil freedom during the period 1986–2002 by subtracting the 1986 FH Score from the 2002 FH Score. A country whose measure of “ $\Delta$ Repression” increases during the period indicates a country that is becoming more repressive, while a country with a declining measure indicates a process of liberalization or declining repression.

The expectations about the relationship between “Repression” and “ $\Delta$ Repression” and the incidence and intensity of terrorism are mixed and complex. The absence of state repression of independent political expression and organization may lead to an increase of terrorism as militant groups are afforded the organizational opportunity to plan and conduct acts of political violence without fear of disruption by state surveillance, imprisonment, or torture. Nonrepressive, democratic societies also afford citizens legal rights that constrain and hamper law enforcement and counter-terrorism measures, thus suggesting that “Repression” and “ $\Delta$ Repression” may be negatively related to terrorist activity. Conversely, in a society with a highly repressive state apparatus and undemocratic political structure, citizens who would ordinarily pursue peaceful and legalistic avenues of political expression may find illegal or violent political action the only available opportunity. Moreover, causation may be difficult to determine. It is possible that a state becomes more repressive *in response to* terrorist acts or the threat of terrorism, rather than functioning as a precipitant of terrorist activity itself. Therefore, “Repression” and “ $\Delta$ Repression” may be either positively or negatively related to terrorism.

The final political variable, “# of Parties,” measures the number of governing and opposition political parties that comprise the lower (lawmaking) houses of national legislatures in the countries examined between 1986–2002 as a means to consider the “social cleavage theory” of party systems as it relates to terrorism. In the instance where the country was a non-democratic bureaucracy characterized by “one-party rule”—such as Syria or Cuba—a “1” was coded for “# of Parties.”

In the case where the country was a non-democratic autocracy—such as Bahrain, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia—a “0” was coded.<sup>50</sup> The expectation, therefore, is that “# of Parties” is positively related to the incidence and casualty rate of terrorism.

Therefore, the objective of the study is to consider the claims of the “rooted-in-poverty” (or “relative deprivation”), “political opportunity,” and “social cleavage theory of party systems” explanations for terrorism by analyzing the following hypotheses:

$H_1$  = The economic indicators GINI Coefficient, Inflation, and Unemployment are positively related to the incidence and casualty rate of terrorism.

$H_2$  = The economic indicators HDI 1985–99, GDP Growth, and Calories Per Capita are negatively related to the incidence and casualty rate of terrorism.

$H_3$  = The demographic indicators, Population, Population Growth, and Ethno-Religious Diversity are positively related to the incidence and casualty rate of terrorism.

$H_4$  = The political indicators, Repression,  $\Delta$ Repression, and # of Parties are positively or negatively related to the incidence and casualty rate of terrorism.

## Results

A multiple regression analysis of the above variables is run, the results of which are summarized in Table 3.

**Table 3.** Regression models 1 and 2—terrorism incidents and casualties 1986–2002

	1 Incidents 1986–02	2 Casualties 1986–02
Economic Variables		
HDI 1985–99	.004 (.021)	1.260 (.778)
GINI coeff.	.351 (.221)	7.368 (8.143)
GDP growth	.000 (.009)	.000 (.330)
Inflation	.008 (.015)	–.539 (.550)
Unemployment	–.049 (.160)	6.676 (5.890)
Calories per capita	–.003 (.007)	–.078 (.245)
Demographic Variables		
Population	<b>.168*</b> (.024)	3.279 (.881)
Population growth	–.011 (.249)	2.592 (9.188)
Ethno-religious diversity	–.000 (.002)	<b>.264*</b> (.073)
Political Variables		
Repression	.006 (.017)	.321 (.614)
$\Delta$ Repression	<b>.038*</b> (.015)	.543 (.545)
# of parties	<b>1.386*</b> (.568)	5.528 (20.950)
Constant	–7.225 (22.850)	–1182.613 (842.852)
R-square	.643	.345
n	95	95

All coefficients are unstandardized B measurements; standard errors in parentheses.

\*Indicates significance at the .05 level or higher.

**Table 4.** Regression models 3–8

	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Incidents	Casualties	Incidents	Casualties	Incidents	Casualties
HDI 1985–99	.007 (.021)	.923 (.834)	-.018 (.026)	.803 (.799)	-.002 (.020)	.981 (.827)
GINI coeff.	.294 (.224)	7.637 (8.781)	.269 (.279)	4.834 (8.700)	.336 (.214)	6.866 (8.702)
GDP growth	.001 (.009)	.144 (.354)	.007 (.001)	.082 (.333)	.002 (.009)	.097 (.352)
Inflation	.002 (.015)	-.202 (.577)	-.004 (.019)	-.772 (.586)	.015 (.014)	-.503 (.582)
Unemployment	-.137 (.160)	6.718 (6.278)	-.262 (.199)	2.719 (6.206)	-.101 (.153)	4.543 (6.223)
Calories per capita	-.005 ( <b>.007</b> )	-.041 ( <b>.265</b> )	.001 ( <b>.008</b> )	-.021 ( <b>.260</b> )	-.003 ( <b>.006</b> )	-.060 ( <b>.260</b> )
Population growth	-.091 (.255)	.819 (9.985)	.351 (.294)	10.588 (9.170)	-.173 (.237)	1.255 (9.642)
Ethno-Rel diversity	-	-	.001 ( <b>.003</b> )	<b>.276* (.078)</b>	-.001 ( <b>.002</b> )	<b>.273* (.078)</b>
Repression	.001 (.017)	.593 (.657)	-	-	-.023 (.016)	.172 (.642)
$\Delta$ Repression	<b>.042*</b> (.015)	.719 (.588)	-	-	<b>.039*</b> (.014)	.571 (.582)
# of parties	<b>1.378*</b> (.586)	11.621 (22.948)	<b>3.879*</b> (.545)	<b>53.002*</b> (17.011)	-	-
Pop*diversity	<b>.001*</b> (.000)	<b>.002**</b> (.001)	-	-	-	-
Pop*repression	-	-	.001 (.000)	.001 (.011)	-	-
Pop*# of parties	-	-	-	-	<b>.005*</b> (.000)	<b>.066*</b> (.020)
Constant	4.663 (23.368)	-932.353 (914.667)	-9.980 (23.021)	-1066.060 (717.975)	15.224 (21.191)	-785.467 (862.981)
R-square	.626	.238	.409	.263	.661	.254
n	95	95	95	95	95	95

All coefficients are unstandardized B measurements; standard errors in parentheses.

\* Indicates significance at the .05 level or higher.

\*\* Indicates significance at .01 level or higher.

Models 1 and 2 yield arresting results. *None* of the economic indicators are significant predictors of either terrorist incidents or casualties, contrary to the expectations necessary to validate the “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis. Rather, some of the demographic and political variables appear as significant predictors. In Model 1, as a predictor of the incidence of terrorism from 1986 to 2002, “# of Parties” has the largest positive coefficient, and is significant at the .05 level. “Population” has the strongest p-value—significant at the .000 level—and is a positive predictor of the incidence of terrorism, while “ $\Delta$ Repression” has a small though significant (.05 level) positive relationship with the incidence of terrorism. Model 2, where the dependent variable is the casualty rate due to terrorism, shows that there are only two significant predictors and both are positive: “Population,” which has a large coefficient and is significant at the .000 level, and “Ethno-Religious Diversity” which is significant at the .01 level.

The only variable that is a significant predictor of *both* dependent variables—the incidence *and* casualty rate due to terrorism—is “Population.” The more populous states in the data set are clearly more prone to terrorism than are the smaller states, and this finding corresponds to that of Fearon and Laitin.<sup>51</sup> The other significant independent variables are predictors of either terrorist incidents or casualties, but not both. So a second set of models is run, combining “Population” with the other three significant independent variables to form three interaction terms: “Population \* [Ethno-Religious] Diversity”; “Population \* Repression”; and “Population \* # of Parties.” The results obtained of this second set of models are displayed in Table 4.

Again, the models, numbered 3 through to 8, are divided by the two dependent variables, terrorist incidents and terrorist casualties. There are several important results. First, “# of Parties” is found to be significant as a positive predictor for *both* incidents of and casualties due to terrorism (Models 3, 5, and 6) and has large coefficients for each. By themselves, again, “Repression” and “Ethno-Religious Diversity” are significant positive predictors of either terrorist incidents or casualties, *but not both*. However, the interaction term “Population \* Diversity” is a positive significant predictor of both incidents and casualties in Models 3 and 4, suggesting perhaps that large, diverse states are more conducive to terrorist activity than are smaller, more ethnically and religiously homogeneous ones. Likewise, the interaction term “Population \* # of Parties” is also significant both for incidents and casualties (Models 7 and 8)—though with small coefficients, suggesting that populous states with multiparty systems are more prone to terrorism than are smaller, one-, two-, or three-party system states. The interaction term “Population \* Repression” predictor is not found to be significant at all, suggesting a lack of explanatory value in comparison to the other two combined variables.

### **Discussion: Terrorism, Party Systems, and Social Cleavages**

The statistical models above demonstrate that there is no empirical evidence to support the crux of the “rooted-in-poverty” thesis—popularized by world leaders, the media, and some scholars—that poor economic development, measured as low levels of per capita income, literacy, life expectancy, more equal distribution of wealth, growth of GDP, stable prices, employment opportunities, and food security, is related to increased levels of terrorism. The implication of this conclusion is undoubtedly disturbing to many policymakers, for it removes a potential “cure” for the scourge of terrorism and a tool in preventing political violence: renewed commitment to economic development and betterment of the human condition.

Also, for many policymakers who ideologically support very worthwhile antipoverty strategies and maintain, with some justification, that acute global poverty is a politically unsustainable condition, this conclusion is particularly disappointing. Finally, the results are unable to validate the “relative deprivation” approach to political violence theorized by Gurr,<sup>52</sup> or at least do not indicate that relative deprivation can explain terrorism—if terrorism should be considered separate from internal political violence or civil war.

The results of the analysis do, however, provide support for much of the “political opportunities” literature on political violence and suggest that the “social cleavage theory” of party systems, which hypothesizes that social and cultural stratification is linked to sociopolitical institutions like party systems, may be a better explanatory tool for terrorism than the “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis that is currently in vogue. More diverse societies, in terms of ethnic and religious demography, and political systems with large, complex, multiparty systems were more likely to experience terrorism than were more homogeneous states with few or no parties at the national level.

As previously mentioned, scholars have observed empirically validated relationships between weak party systems, social diversity, and political violence. Empirical studies of “aggregative majority party systems” have demonstrated a relationship between multipartism and the opportunity for political disorder and political extremism. Aggregative majority party systems are highly stable political systems where a small number—usually two—parties comprise the political system and where the parties themselves are ideologically moderate, pragmatic, “median-vote-seeking” actors characterized to a large degree by internal diversity and inter-party similarities.<sup>53</sup> This typology of party system tends to produce functional majorities in the electorate and creates pressures on the parties themselves to move to the electoral center during campaigns. Facilitated by the need to accommodate a diversity of internal subgroups and interests, either party is prevented from moving to extremist positions that would potentially sow anti-system sentiments in society. Moreover, aggregative majority party systems are more likely to offer policies that will meet the satisfaction of a broad cross-cut of the society, are flexible and able to more easily adapt policy solutions freer of ideological baggage, thus affording the system long-term stability.<sup>54</sup> Mancur Olson also argues that centralized, two-party systems produce more efficient and successful public policies than do weak, multiparty systems, and are economically “encompassing” in that they are not as prone to pursuing radical redistributive policies.<sup>55</sup>

The social cleavage theory of party systems posits that the number of (significant) political parties that win votes, make up national legislatures, and form governments is inversely related to the “strength” and stability of party systems. Countries marked by severe socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, or regional divisions will likely be “weak” party systems and will have a multitude of national political parties represented in legislatures and in governing coalitions. Weak party systems are accompanied by several features that can lead to political violence: an inability to moderate and integrate the participation of newly mobilized political forces into legal political behavior,<sup>56</sup> and the empowerment and success of extremist, anti-system political forces in government in a “centrifugal” and “immoderate” configuration.<sup>57</sup> The first feature is a familiar tenet of Modernization Theory in comparative politics while the second feature, the preponderance of extremist parties within weak party systems, is empirically substantiated by Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. In

a study of 103 elections in sixteen countries from 1970 to 1990, Jackman and Volpert found that multipartism fosters extreme right parties, along with high unemployment rates and diminished electoral thresholds for seating in parliaments.<sup>58</sup>

***Paradigmatic Cases: India, Israel, and Colombia***

Both of these features of weak party systems—the inability of severe multipartism to institutionalize social and political conflicts and thereby manage them and the preponderance of extremist or anti-system parties—are features of three exemplary terrorism-prone countries in the dataset. India, Israel-Palestine, and Colombia, all three of which appear in *both* the top-ten lists for countries for incidents of terrorism and casualty rates due to terrorism (Tables 1 and 2), are marked by three weak party system features: acute social, religious, and linguistic diversity; large numbers of parties in government and/or national legislatures; and the presence of extremist parties that place strain on the electoral and governing system.

The Indian polity, in addition to having severe religious and caste cleavages, is acutely divided by region and language. The official language, Hindi, is exclusively a language of the North, and Hindi-speakers, though the largest single linguistic group, comprise only about 30 percent of the total population. Language disputes mirror state and regional conflicts in India, which have been quite bloody and entrenched. In Israel, the conflict between the Jewish majority and Arab minority in Israel proper, where Israeli Jews are around 80 percent of the population, is made more complex by the more violent conflict in the Occupied Territories, which, if included, drive the total Jewish population of Israel-Palestine to 41 percent of the total. Moreover, ethnic conflict has emerged as a key feature of the Jewish population of Israel proper, where the politically and economically dominant Ashkenazim (Jews of European and American origin) comprise only between 30 and 50 percent of the total Jewish population. This latter “internal” Israeli division is increasingly mirrored within the Israeli party system, where the Mizrachim or “Oriental Jews” have come to support anti-establishment parties on the political right. Colombia, while 90 percent Roman Catholic and overwhelmingly Spanish-speaking, has significant ethnic diversity with Mestizos (mixed European and indigenous origin) comprising around 58 percent of the population. “White” European-origin, “Black” and mulatto, and Amerind or indigenous Colombians comprise the remainder of the population. However, the primary social cleavage in Colombia has traditionally been one of class in the rural countryside (landless or sharecropping peasants versus landlords) with race and ethnicity more complexly related.<sup>59</sup>

All three countries have relatively chaotic legislatures marked by large numbers of parties, frequent minority government, and a correspondingly chaotic portfolio and cabinet system. For example, the Indian Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) between 1999 and 2004 seated thirty-eight parties, with the then governing Bharatiya Janaata Party (BJP) holding only 23.7 percent of the total seats and leading a shaky coalition of nine other parties and a handful of nonpartisan parliamentarians. This framework—complex multiparty minority government—has been the status quo in India since the decline of the Congress Party in 1967. The Israeli Knesset (unicameral legislature), a frequently cited model of parliamentary instability, has been led by a four-party minority coalition headed by the Likud or conservative party—itsself holding only 29.4 percent of the total seats—since the collapse of a national unity government in January of 2003. The Israeli Knesset has seen the

emergence since the mid-1980s of the two major parties (Likud and Labour) that are unable to govern without coalition support from smaller, ideologically narrow parties occupying more than half of the total seats in the parliament. Colombia, a presidential system, is officially enshrined as a two-party system since the 1991 constitutional reforms, but the main Liberal and Conservative parties hold only 42.3 percent of the total seats combined in the House of Representatives and 40.6 percent in the Senate since the latest elections in March 2002. Smaller parties proliferate (around twenty-seven of them), though some of them are de facto regional “clients” of the national two parties.<sup>60</sup>

All three countries, finally, have political systems and legislatures where extremist or anti-system parties have a significant voice. The BJP in India came to power in the early 1990s through a coalition alliance with the radical Hindu-nationalist Shiv Sena Party—(itself connected to the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), a radical Hindu-nationalist paramilitary movement)—a Sikh religious party and a highly unstable collection of regionalist parties. India’s fragmented party system allows Shiv Sena, which held only fifteen out of the 545 seats in the Lok Sabha, to have a voice in national affairs and prompted the BJP to award Sri Lal Krishna Advani, a radical BJP member with close relations with the RSS, the Deputy Prime Minister, Home Affairs, and Personnel, Pensions and Public Grievances portfolios. The hard line adopted by the BJP and its right-wing allies towards Pakistan and the disputed state of Kashmir was marked by the increase of Hindu-Muslim communal violence throughout the country as well as an intensification of terrorism by Kashmiri militants. Indeed, between 1986 and 2002, the lion’s share of terrorist incidents and casualties in India were committed by the three main militant groups of Kashmir: Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Hizb ul-Mujahedin, and Jaysh al-Mohammed.

Likewise, smaller, more radical parties in Israel are afforded a disproportionate amount of power in national policy decisions and portfolio distribution. *Both* the mainstream Labour and Likud parties have been forced to make coalition governments with the small, extremist-religious National Religious Party and the National Union Party. Other smaller, ultra-conservative Jewish parties, most of which oppose any sort of land-for-peace settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, such as United Torah Judaism, Shas, Geshet, and Tsomet, have held the balance in all governing coalitions excluding national unity governments since the early 1990s, thereby stalling the implementation of the 1993 Oslo Accords, dramatically narrowing and focusing the range of policy options for Labour and Likud, drawing out the settlement of a final peace agreement, and thereby strengthening militant Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Finally, extremist parties and political movements have also been standing features of the Colombian national legislature since the 1980s. In the 1991 elections, the former leftist guerilla movement M-19 won 26.8 percent of the national vote and obtained nineteen seats in the Senate, while the Liberal Party obtained twenty-five, the Conservatives netted nine, and seventeen went to other party lists. In the most recent 2002 elections, which saw the two main parties controlling the presidency and its cabinets, two former M-19 guerilla leaders, Navarro Wolf and Gustavo Petro, won seats in the Senate and the House, respectively, under a party list titled “Via Alterna” (Alternate Path). Moreover, a violent right-wing paramilitary, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), emerged as an important “kingmaker,” having supported 35 percent of the successful candidates to the legislature, most of whom ran in smaller parties or as independents.<sup>61</sup>

These three countries reflect the general findings in the study about the relationship between social cleavages, weak party systems, and the incidence and intensity of terrorism. They, along with the results of the large-*n* statistical models presented in the study, underscore the salience of social cleavage theory to the understanding of the root causes of terrorism in the world today. Perhaps in determining the direction of contemporary anti-terrorism policy, international policymakers might consider the danger that poor *and* more developed divided societies pose to international security.

### Data Appendix—List of Variables and Sources used in Regression Models

**HDI 1985–99** = Average Human Development Index for country, 1985–1999. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (various years).

**GINI Coefficient** = Average GINI coefficient for country, 1986–2001. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (various years).

**GDP Growth** = Average annual rate of growth of gross domestic product per capita, 1986–2001. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (various years).

**Inflation** = Average annual rate of inflation for country, 1986–2001. World Bank, *World Development Report* (various years).

**Unemployment** = Average percentage of national workforce that is unemployed, 1986–2002. International Labor Organization, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* (various years).

**Calories** = Average daily per capita caloric supply for country, 1970 and 1997. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (2001).

**Population** = Average total national population, 1975–2000. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (various years).

**Population Growth** = Average national population growth rate, 1975–2000. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (various years).

**Ethno-Religious Diversity** = Measure of the diversity or homogeneity of the largest ethnic and religious groups in a country = (100-largest ethnic group) \* (100-largest religious group). *PRS Political Risk Yearbook*, Volumes 1–8 (2002); *CIA World Factbook* (2002).

**Repression** = Measure of average civil and political freedom in a country between 1986 and 2002 on a scale between 1 and 7 where 1 is “free” and 7 is “not free.” Freedom House, *Freedom in the World Country Ratings: 1972 to 2002*.

**ΔRepression** = Measure of the change of civil and political freedom, 1986 to 2001, where a negative score indicates a movement towards greater freedom and a positive score indicates a movement away from freedom. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World Country Ratings: 1972 to 2002*.

**# of Parties** = Number of political parties with seats in lower house of national legislature, 1986–2001. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report* (various years); George E. Delury, *World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties: Third Edition* (New York: Facts on File, 1999). Note: For nondemocratic countries characterized by one-party-rule, a “1” is coded for # of Parties. For nondemocratic countries characterized by an absence of a legal party system, a “0” is coded for # of Parties. Illegal or underground parties are not included in coding.



## Notes

1. The author would like to acknowledge the work of Amy R. Hobbs, who served as research assistant to the project.
2. "Press Release GA/9971: Terrorism Must Be Addressed in Parallel with Poverty, Underdevelopment and Inequality, General Assembly is Told," *United Nations News Service*, November 2001.
3. Teresa Watanabe, "Clinton Says U.S. Must Give More to End Terrorism," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 January 2002.
4. Harry Kreisler, "The World Bank and Private Sector Development: A Conversation with Nemat Shafik," *Conversations with History Series* (2001), Institute of International Studies, U.C. Berkeley, 13 November 2001.
5. Janet L. Jai, "Getting at the Roots of Terrorism," *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 December 2001.
6. Paul Blustein, "Bush Seeks Foreign Aid Boost; Plan Counters Overseas Critics," *Washington Post*, 15 March 2002, p. A10.
7. This is the timeframe for the main statistical analysis in the paper.
8. Source: U.S. State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Counterterrorism).
9. The figures for Israel-Palestine are aggregate measures of terrorist activity and the socioeconomic measurements are combinations of population-weighted figures for per capita GDP and HDI scores. In the larger study, Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories are treated as one unit.
10. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?: The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers," *The New Republic*, 24 June 2002.
11. M. I. Lichbach, "An Evaluation of 'Does Inequality Breed Political Conflict?'" *World Politics* 41 (July 1989): 431–470.
12. See, for example, Ekkart Zimmerman, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolution: Theories and Research* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1983) and William J. Linehan, "Political Instability and Economic Inequality: Some Conceptual Clarifications," *Journal of Peace Science* 4 (Spring 1980): 134–139.
13. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 3–4.
14. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
15. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
16. Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Insurgency," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4 (1990): 425–452.
17. Bruce London and Thomas D. Robinson, "The Effects of International Dependence on Income Inequality and Political Violence," *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 2 (April 1989): 305–308.
18. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
19. Hassan M. Nejad, "Inequality in an Urban Revolution: The Case of Iran," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Inequality and Contemporary Revolutions* (Denver, CO: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1986).
20. Clive Kileff and Leland W. Robinson, "The Elitist Thesis and the Rhodesian Revolution: Implications for South Africa," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. (see note 19 above).
21. Russell R. Hamby, "Coffee and Conflict in Colombia: Spatial, Temporal and Class Patterns of 'La Violencia'," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. (see note 19 above).
22. Manus I. Midlarsky, "Rulers and Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 491–509.
23. Morehead Kennedy, "The 21st Century Conditions Likely to Inspire Terrorism," in Harvey Kushner, ed., *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998).
24. Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence* (New York: Wiley, 1973).

25. Austin T. Turk, "Social Dynamics of Terrorism," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 463 (September 1982): 119–128.

26. Lawrence C. Hamilton and James D. Hamilton, "Dynamics of Terrorism," *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (March 1983): 39–54.

27. Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, "Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4 (1990): 624–651.

28. Kurt Schock, "A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship Between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 98–133.

29. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Working Papers on Social Development* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000).

30. Harold R. Kerbo, "Foreign Involvement in the Preconditions for Political Violence: The World System and the Case of Chile," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, no. 3 (1978): 363–391.

31. Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998).

32. Robert I. Rotberg, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 3 (1993): 317–329.

33. The unusually high levels of political turbulence in the 1970s are well documented empirically, and the exceptionalism of the 1970s applies to phenomena beyond terrorism. Consider the dramatic increase in labor conflict during the 1970s. See, for example, Michael Shalev, "The Resurgence of Labor Quiescence," in Mario Regini, ed., *The Future of Labor Movements* (London: Sage, 1992), 102–132.

34. Muller and Weede (see note 27 above); Schock (see note 28 above).

35. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59 (1994): 1–22; Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967); Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

36. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). The philosophical hegemony of the social cleavage theorists' preferences for the two-party system of the United States or Great Britain as a more stable alternative to the multiparty system of France and Italy was such that the American Political Science Association formally endorsed it in 1950. See American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," *American Political Science Review* 44, no. 3 (1950).

37. Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert, "Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 4 (1996): 501–521; Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Leon Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

38. Note that the definition of "noncombatant" used by the U.S. Department of State includes, in addition to civilians, military personnel who are either not armed or not on duty at the time of the incident.

39. The author originally constructed two datasets, one allocating terrorist incidents and casualties to the country where the event(s) occurred or originated and another taking into account the national origins of the perpetrators (e.g., a terrorist attack by Turks living in Germany was registered as an incident in Germany in one set and Turkey in another set) and found no significant statistical effects on the results. This is primarily due to the small number of these sorts of events in the total dataset.

40. Therefore, the kidnapping of thirty people in Angola by UNITA rebels in 1989 would be registered as thirty victims, one incident for Angola in 1989.

41. See the United Nations Development Program, "Technical Note 1: Calculating the Human Development Indices," *Human Development Report* (2001).

42. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

43. Hibbs (see note 24 above).

44. Gurr (see note 13 above).

45. Fearon and Laitin (see note 18 above).
46. Huntington (see note 14 above).
47. Fearon and Laitin (see note 18 above).
48. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
49. Freedom House has conducted annual surveys of political freedom and civil liberties in 192 countries and eighteen disputed territories since 1955 and produced a rating between one and seven and an overall designation of “free,” “partly free,” and “not free” for each country or territory. A full description of the methodology used by Freedom House in conducting its surveys and coding the results can be found at [www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm](http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm).
50. A “bureaucracy” is a nondemocratic state characterized formally as a republic where one party dominates all power without legal competitors. An “autocracy” is a nondemocratic state where the leadership does not use a party system to monopolize political power. For full empirical definitions of “bureaucracy” and “autocracy,” see Przeworski et al. (note 42 above).
51. Fearon and Laitin (see note 18 above).
52. Gurr (see note 13 above).
53. Downs (see note 36 above).
54. G. Bingham Powell, “Political Cleavage Structure, Cross-Pressure Processes and Partisanship,” *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (1976): 1–24; Epstein (see note 37 above); Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1966); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960); David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951).
55. Olson (see note 37 above). Note that there are some detractors to the aggregative majority party system preference. Arend Lijphart, noting the instability of the two-party system in Austria immediately following World War II, argues that deeply divided societies could in principle benefit from multipartism because representation of interests would be wider and elites could be empowered to better represent their constituents’ interests. He also notes that if a country is already homogeneous and has little social tension, any party system could be stable. See Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).
56. Huntington (see note 14 above).
57. Sartori (see note 37 above).
58. Jackman and Volpert (see note 37 above).
59. Source for all statistics: *CIA World Factbook* ([www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/)).
60. Source for all statistics: “Elections Around the World” ([www.electionworld.com](http://www.electionworld.com)).
61. Ibid.
62. See Pradeep K. Chhibber, *Democracy Without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

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